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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is a direct appeal as of right in a domestic relations proceeding in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION 
I. ARE THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS 
CONCLUSION THAT THERE OCCURRED A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH JUSTIFIES MODIFICATION? 
The sufficiency of a trial court's findings of fact is a question of law which should be 
reviewed for correctness. Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Wells v. Wells. 
871 P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1994). Preservation of the issue at trial is not applicable. State v. 
Larsen. 999 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247 
(Utah. App. 1997). 
H. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT A 
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED 
WHICH JUSTIFIES MODIFICATION? 
The trial court's findings should be overturned only if they are clearly erroneous, and only 
where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Thomas v. Thomas. 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). However, if the findings are so 
inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations, the appellant 
should be relieved of her burden to marshal the evidence. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 
477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Preservation of the issue at trial is not applicable. Larsen. 999 P.2d 
1252 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); ProMax. 943 P.2d 247 (Utah. App. 1997). 
m. ARE THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
ORDERREDUCINGMR. MONTAGUES ALIMONY OBLIGATION FROM $600.00 
PER MONTH TO $150.00 PER MONTH? 
The sufficiency of a trial court's findings of fact is a question of law which should be 
reviewed for correctness. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct App. 1998); Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 
(Utah App. 1994). Preservation of the issue at trial is not applicable. Larsen. 999 P.2d 1252 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000); ProMax, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah. App. 1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an alimony modification case which arises as a result of Mr. Montague's cessation 
of employment from his longtime employer, the LDS Church, and his corresponding obtainment 
of new employment at a substantially lower wage than his historical earnings. 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
A decree of divorce between the parties was entered on or about December 5,1996. The 
decree was the result of a negotiated settlement agreement between the parties, the terms of 
which, inter alia, provided an award of alimony to Ms. Montague in the amount of $600.00 per 
month. On October 14, 1998, after experiencing the loss of his long-term employment and a 
significant reduction in income, Mr. Montague filed a Petition for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce alleging a substantial and material change in circumstances occurred which warranted 
downward modification of his alimony obligation. Trial on Mr. Montague's Petition was held on 
January 5, 2000. 
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3. DISPOSITION BELOW. 
After taking evidence and testimony at the January 5, 2000 trial, the trial Court ordered 
that Mr. Montague's alimony obligation to Ms. Montague be reduced from $600.00 per month 
to $150.00 per month. No post-trial motions were filed. This appeal ensued. 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
At the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce Mr. Montague was employed full time with 
the LDS Church (the Church) employment office as Supervisor of the Church's Granger 
Employment Office, and earned a gross income of $3726.00 per month. (Exhibit 5, Addendum 
2). He had been employed by the Church for over twenty years. (R. 10). 
On June 26, 1998 Mr. Montague was placed on disciplinary probation, was demoted to 
the position of employment specialist, and was transferred from the Granger Employment Center 
to its Bountiful Employment office for reasons relating to poor work performance. (Exhibits 21, 
22, Addendum 8, 9). Mr. Montague did not deny the allegations leading up to his disciplinary 
probation, demotion and transfer. (Id.). Subsequent to his demotion and transfer, and while still 
on disciplinary probation, issues concerning Mr. Montague's on-the-job conduct and work 
performance persisted. (R. 99, Exhibit 1, Addendum 1). 
Ultimately, on July 13, 1998, a meeting occurred between Mr. Montague and Church 
human resources personnel, namely Ron Garrison and Dean Walker (Exhibit 1, Addendum 1). 
At this meeting Mr. Montague was informed that he would not be able to return to the Bountiful 
office, and was provided with four options: (1) resign from employment, (2) be terminated due 
to inappropriate conduct and lack of performance, (3) follow the grievance policy of the Church, 
-3-
or (4) meet with Gary Winters on Friday, July 17,1998 to discuss his concerns. Mr. Montague 
was afforded two weeks leave to think about what he wanted to do. (Id.). 
After being provided with the four options mentioned above, Mr. Montague made no 
efforts whatsoever to retain his employment with the Church. (& 46-48). Instead, on July 27, 
1998 Mr. Montague submitted a letter indicating that he was resigning his employment with the 
Church. (Exhibit 16, Addendum 4, R. 47). At no time after his resignation did Mr. Montague 
contest or challenge the actions of his employer or the circumstances leading to his resignation. 
(R. 27). Mr. Montague accepted new employment at a substantially lower salary, approximately 
$2083.00 per month. (Exhibits 3, 5, Addendum 2, 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INADEQUATE TO ALLOW FOR 
MEANINGFUL REVIEW. 
The trial court's findings of fact are conclusoiy and so insufficiently detailed that they 
cannot be viewed as legally sufficient. The absence of adequate findings is reversible error and 
this Court cannot sustain them as supportive of the conclusions of law or the ultimate ruling. 
n. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING THAT A 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED WHICH JUSTIFIES 
MODIFICATION. 
Even if the findings of fact are inadequate, the evidence is uncontroverted that (1) Mr. 
Montague had successfully retained employment with the Church for over twenty years, (2) his 
own misconduct played a key role in the loss of his employment, (3) he made no attempt to retain 
his employment even though presented with opportunity to do so, and (4) he never challenged 
his loss of employment as wrongful. In sum, even marshaling all evidence in favor of the trial 
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court's ruling, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is such that the trial court abused its 
discretion in determining that Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church, that "the degree of 
culpability that would need to be attributed to him in connection with the loss of his job, to deny 
him the relief he seeks, does not exist", and that a material change in circumstances occurred 
justifying modification. 
m. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ARTICULATE ITS ANALYSIS IN REDUCING 
ALIMONY FROM $600.00 TO $150.00 PER MONTH. 
Even if this court were to determine that the trial court did not err in determining that there 
occurred a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying modification, the trial court 
still did not adequately articulate its decision to reduce alimony to the specific amount of $ 150.00 
per month. While testimony and evidence were presented relating to the respective incomes and 
expenses of the parties, the court made no findings whatsoever relating to the factors it must 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO ALLOW FOR 
MEANINGFUL REVIEW. 
A trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate what 
circumstances have changed and why these changes support the modification made in the prior 
divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear and 
uncontroverted and only support the judgment. Muirv. Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (quoting Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57,61 (Utah Ct App. 1990)). The findings 
should be more than cursory statements; they must be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
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subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. Id. (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). The absence of 
adequate findings of fact "ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial 
court." Woodward 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In this case, the trial court concluded that there had occurred a material change in 
circumstances and then reduced Mr. Montague's alimony obligation from $600.00 per month to 
$150.00 per month. The findings, however, are conclusory almost in their entirety. They are 
woefully deficient and cannot be said to adequately support either the conclusions of law or 
ultimate ruling. 
Firstly, there is no dispute that Mr. Montague's job loss constitutes a change in 
circumstances. What is disputed is whether the change in circumstances justifies modification. 
See. Bridenbaueh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah Ct App, 1990); Paffelv.PaffeL732P.2d 
96,103 (Utah 1986): Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156,161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In order 
to determine whether the change in circumstances justifies modification, the voluntariness of Mr. 
Montague's cessation of employment with the LDS Church is critical. It would be manifestly 
unjust and constitute bad public policy for the trial court to grant Mr. Montague an alimony 
reduction if he voluntary left his higher paying job. However, the only findings relating to Mr. 
Montague's job loss are: 
1. "Mr. Montague lost his job of twenty plus years with the LDS Church." 
(Findings of Fact and Order, p. 2); and 
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2. "...Mr Montague's actions did have something to do with the fact that he was 
terminated ....but he did not intend or want to be terminated from employment. The 
degree of culpability that would need to be attributed to him in connection with the loss 
of his job, to deny him the relief he seeks, does not exist" (Id.). 
The first finding is not helpful because the wording "lost his job" could be applied to 
either a voluntary or involuntary cessation of employment. Likewise, the second finding is of no 
use because it is conclusory. There are no other detailed findings that give this Court any 
guidance in determining how the trial court reached the conclusion that the"degree of culpability" 
attributable to Mr. Montague "does not exist" or whether modification was justified as a threshold 
matter. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING THAT A 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED WHICH JUSTIFIES 
MODIFICATION. 
The trial court's findings should be overturned only if they are clearly erroneous, and only 
where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Thomas, 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Remand for adequate findings on a particular 
factual issue is unnecessary if the evidence concerning the issue is undisputed. Id.; Levitz v. 
Warrington. 877 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). In this case the relevant facts are essentially undisputed. There is no dispute that Mr. 
Montague no longer holds his employment with the Church or that he now earns an income 
substantially less than that which he earned while employed with the LDS Church. There also 
is no dispute that at the July 13,1998 meeting Mr. Montague was presented with four options and 
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that he later submitted a letter of resignation. What is at issue is proper application of the facts. 
At trial Mr. Montague argued that he resigned because he believed that going through the 
grievance procedure would be for naught, and because he was told and believed he would have 
lost his retirement benefits if he went through the Church's grievance procedure and lost. 
Appellant asserts that Mr. Montague's beliefs are irrelevant - that what is relevant is limited to 
Mr. Montague's act of resignation without even attempting to avail himself of the opportunity to 
keep his job. 
A. CLEAR ERROR AND MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
The trial court's findings should be overturned only if they are clearly erroneous, and only 
where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Thomas. 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
1. CLEAR ERROR. 
In this case the trial court determined that Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church 
(R. 129). However, such a determination is clearly erroneous. Rulings in unemployment cases 
offer guidance as to whether Mr. Montague initiated the separation or whether it was initiated 
by the Church. In Lanier v. Industrial Commission. 694 P.2d 625 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court determined that the burden of proof in unemployment compensation proceedings falls upon 
the claimant to establish eligibility for benefits. Such a burden requires that a claimant show he 
did not leave work voluntarily, defining "voluntarily" as meaning "at the volition of the employee, 
in contrast to a firing or other termination at the behest of the employer." (Id). In Lanier, the 
Supreme Court also found relevant the fact, as is the case here, that the claimant "failed to protest 
-8-
his termination through hospital grievance procedures with which he was familiar" as 
corroborative of an intent to voluntarily leave his employment. In SOS Staffing Services. Inc., 
v. Workforce Appeals Board. 983 P.2d 58L (Utah App 1999V this Court determined that in the 
context of an unemployment benefits claim the test for voluntariness in leaving employment is 
not the willingness of the employer that the employee continue working, but rather the 
willingness of the employee to continue. Thus, under this standard whether the LDS Church 
desired the employment relationship to end or continue is irrelevant. "Voluntarily leaving work 
means that the employee severed the employment relationship as contrasted to a separation 
initiated by the employer. This is true regardless of how compelling the claimant's reasons were 
for making the decision to leave the work." (citing Utah Code Admin. P. R994-405-101 (Supp. 
1997)). 
At trial Mr. Montague argued that at the July 13,1998 meeting he was put into a situation 
where he was told either to resign or that he would be terminated. Marshaling the evidence in 
favor of the trial court's determination that Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church, the 
entire facts contained in the record in support thereof are minimal: 
1. Mr. Montague did not want to lose his job with the Church. (R. 62); 
2. Mr. Montague submitted a letter of resignation because he was told and 
believed that he was not wanted in Church employment any longer. (R. 18, 27-8,45-6); 
3. Mr. Montague submitted a letter of resignation because he was told and 
believed that if he went through the Church's grievance procedure and lost, he would lose 
his vested retirement benefits. (R. 26); 
-9-
4. Two of the four options presented to Mr. Montague at the July 13, 1998 
meeting were for him to resign or be terminated. (Exhibit 1, Addendum 1). 
Appellant can find no other evidence which supports the conclusion that Mr. Montague 
was terminated. By contrast, the overwhelming weight of evidence points to the conclusion that 
Mr. Montague voluntarily resigned. At the July 13, 1998 meeting, two of the four options 
presented to Mr. Montague did not involve separation - following the grievance policy of the 
Church, and meeting with Gary Winters on Friday, July 17,1998 to discuss his concerns. (Id.). 
After being presented with these options Mr. Montague was given two weeks of leave to think 
about his decision (Id.). The decision was placed squarely in Mr. Montague's hands as to what 
option he would elect. Mr. Montague then opted to sign a letter of resignation (R. 47, Exhibit 16, 
Addendum 4). He also signed an exit interview form wherein he acknowledged he had "decided 
to look for new employment." (Exhibit 17, Addendum 5). The Termination Worksheet in Mr. 
Montague's personnel file corroborated this action, indicating "resignation during probation" 
(Exhibit 19, Addendum 7). Further corroboration of voluntary resignation came from Mr. 
Montague's own testimony at trial: 
"...J had a decision to make. Could I go on with my life and be 
happy or do I want to fight and be contentious and argumentative, 
and I'm tired of that. I don't want that anymore. So I made a 
decision IfII just go on with my life, get another job where 
someone wanted me to work there." (R. 28 (Emphasis added)). 
".... I had determined fairly quickly after that [July 13, 1998] 
meeting that I was simply going to go on with my life and try to do 
something better..." (R. 46). 
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Finally, Mr. Montague acknowledged that he gave no thought whatsoever to his alimony 
obligation to Ms. Montague in making his decision whether to resign or attempt to keep his 
employment. (R. 48-49). 
The weight of the evidence also renders implausible Mr. Montague's self-serving assertion 
that he was told that if he went through the grievance procedure and lost, he would lose his vested 
retirement benefits. Firstly, Mr. Montague admitted that despite being given two weeks to make 
a decision, he made no investigation to determine the veracity of his claim that he was told if he 
went through the grievance procedure and lost that he would lose his vested benefits (R.46). 
Further, the grievance policy itself makes no reference to a loss of vested retirement benefits. 
(Exhibit 18, Addendum 6). Also, Dean Walker, then employed in the LDS Church's Human 
Resources department, and present at the July 13, 1998 meeting, testified that Exhibit 1, 
Addendum 1 was an accurate representation of his notes of the July 13,1998 meeting, which also 
makes no reference to loss of vested retirement if going through the grievance procedure. (R. 72-
73). Finally, Ron Garrison, then Director of Human Services for the Welfare Department for the 
Church, also present at the July 13,1998 meeting, testified that he did not tell Mr. Montague that 
he would lose his retirement benefits if he were to go through the grievance procedure (R. 103). 
Mr. Garrison testified that Mr. Montague might even be considered for rehire if he were to apply 
(Exhibit 19, Addendum 7, R. 104-105). 
Under these facts, it was clear error for the trial court to conclude that Mr. Montague was 
"terminated by the church." The trial court's statement that "it was pretty much a foregone 
conclusion that [Mr. Montague's] career was over with the Church" is purely speculator/. If the 
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Church intended to terminate Mr. Montage it would have done so outright or presented Mr. 
Montague with only the first two options. It did not. The fact remains that Mr. Montague was 
provided with the opportunity to defend the allegations against him, and to argue a case for 
keeping his job. He elected not to do so and did not avail himself of either of the two options 
which might have prevented his job loss. It is unknown what would have occurred had he 
availed himself of either of those options. Mr. Montague voluntarily resigned and as such is not 
entitled to relief. Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "We agree with the 
trial court that an able-bodied person who stops working, as an exercise of personal preference 
. . . nonetheless retains the ability to earn and the duty to support. . ." 
2. FLAGRANT INJUSTICE. 
In this case the flagrant injustice flows from the trial court's erroneous determination that 
Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church. Mr. Montague's cessation of employment was 
voluntary. It is unjust to require Ms. Montague to bear the financial burden of Mr. Montague's 
voluntary actions. Mr. Montague was charged with an alimony obligation arising from a twenty 
four year marriage wherein he held full time employment with the LDS Church for equal 
duration. Then, less than two years after being ordered to pay alimony, he resigned from his 
career employment, making no attempt to retain his job even though presented with such 
opportunity. It is bad policy to relieve obligors such as Mr. Montague from the ongoing 
responsibility of attempting to maintain employment, to the extent possible, at or near his 
historical earning capacity, so as to fulfill his court-ordered obligation. Making such a ruling, the 
trial court essentially sends the message to obligors that one has no duty to attempt to retain 
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higher paying employment, and that quitting one's job is sufficient grounds for alimony reduction 
or termination. While Mr. Montague may have not orchestrated or may not have wanted to lose 
his job, the undisputed facts remain that he resigned while not availing himself of options which 
might have allowed him to retain his employment, and without regard for the financial impact 
upon Ms. Montague. Even the scant findings which do exist state that Mr. Montague's own 
misconduct had something to do with his loss of employment. Under such circumstances it is 
unjust to require Ms. Montague to pay for Mr. Montague's actions, which leaves her in a position 
of having to work two jobs to maintain the lifestyle she enjoyed during the twenty four year 
marriage, in which she only worked part-time throughout (R. 84), and in which Mr. Montague 
clearly could afford to provide support but for resigning from his employment. Exacerbating the 
injustice is that after the divorce Ms. Montague paid to Mr. Montague his full share of equity in 
the marital residence by borrowing from her parents (R. 89), an obligation to which she is now 
responsible. Had Mr. Montague's job loss occurred prior to the same, his failure to pay alimony 
could have resulted in an reduction in his equitable lien on the marital residence, in a manner akin 
to what this court permitted in Proctor. 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
B. INVOLUNTARY JOB LOSS AS A PREREQUISITE TO REVISITING THE 
ISSUE OF ALIMONY. 
For the reasons stated above, as a threshold matter to revisiting the original alimony award 
for review, Mr. Montague first should have been required to bear the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his cessation of employment was involuntary and the result 
of no fault of his own. Williamson v Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah Ct. App 1999); citing 
Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). ("The loss of a job . . . may go to [a 
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payor spouse's] ability to pay the judgment, but it is not a proper basis upon which to change the 
amount of the original award.") 
Ultimately, while distinguishable, this case is most analogous to Hill v. HilL 869 P.2d 963 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), in which this court affirmed the trial court's imputation of income and 
finding of voluntary underemployment where the obligor left his employment at Morton Thiokol 
and obtained new employment at much lower pay without regard for the financial impact on his 
spouse. While the facts are similar, this is a modification proceeding whereas Hill was one 
setting an initial award. If this action were a proceeding setting an initial support award, a finding 
of voluntary underemployment and income imputation would be warranted under the facts. In 
this modification action, however, the trial court simply should have denied the petition as not 
justifying modification under the same factual scenario. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO HOLD MR. MONTAGUE TO HIS 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Finally, the record reflects that the trial court did not even hold Mr. Montague to the 
proper burden of proof that the change in circumstances justified modification. In making its 
ruling, the trial court stated: 
"I find that the degree of voluntariness the court thinks is necessary 
to disqualify a person for a change of circumstances on the basis it 
was voluntary underemployment just were not met here and the 
standard that is required for that is not available to [Ms. Montague] 
to defeat the claim that was being asserted by Mr. Montague." 
The trial court's position directly contravenes Bridenbaugh, Paffel and Maughan. As the party 
seeking modification, Mr. Montague should have been charged with the burden of proving that 
his job loss was involuntary, and that what occurred justified modification. Instead, the trial court 
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improperly charged Ms. Montague with the burden of proving that Mr. Montague's job loss was 
voluntary, and that the change did not warrant modification. Thus, in addition to abusing its 
discretion by reaching a conclusion in contravention of the weight of the evidence, the trial court 
did not even hold Mr. Montague to the proper burden of proof 
m. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ARTICULATE ITS ANALYSIS IN REDUCING 
ALIMONY FROM $600.00 TO $150.00 PER MONTH. 
Even if this court were to determine that the trial court did not err in determining that there 
occurred a substantial and material change in circumstances, and that it was proper for the court 
to reopen the question of alimony, the trial court still did not adequately articulate its decision to 
reduce alimony to the amount of $150.00 per month. Testimony and evidence were presented 
as to the respective current incomes and expenses of the parties, but the trial court, while 
commencing an analysis as to need and ability to pay, never finished the same and offered no 
explanation as to why it was reducing alimony to the specific amount of $150.00 per month. 
Utah Code Ann, §30-3-5(7) states in relevant part: 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
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(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
Not only are the scant findings insufficient to justify the award pursuant to case law, the 
trial court's setting of a new alimony award without addressing the statutory factors ruling also 
renders the ruling unsustainable. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact are so devoid of specificity that they cannot be sustained 
as supportive of the conclusions of law and ruling. The findings offer no insight as to the 
analysis, steps or procedure that the trial court utilized in making its ruling. Remand for more 
detailed findings therefore is necessary unless this court can determine from the record that the 
facts essentially are undisputed. In such case this court could substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court. Ms. Montague asserts that the relevant facts essentially are undisputed as to the 
threshold question of whether the change in circumstances warrants modification. The actual 
dispute is proper application of those facts to the law, and that the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence points to the only logical conclusion that Mr. Montague voluntarily resigned his 
employment with the LDS Church. Under such circumstances it was an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to determine that Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church, and 
correspondingly that the change in circumstances justified modification. It is patently unjust for 
-16-
the trial court to require Ms. Montague to shoulder the burden of Mr. Montague's misconduct and 
voluntary decision to seek new employment. 
In the alternative, even if there occurred a substantial and material change in 
circumstances warranting modification, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in 
reducing the alimony award to $150.00 per month without making sufficiently detailed findings 
as to how it arrived at that specific amount. If modification is justified then remand for more 
detailed findings is the only proper action. 
DATED this 75 day of $&p^3rr\bor , 2000. 
RUSSELL Y. MlfrAS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MICHAEL C MONTAGUE, 
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ADDENDUM 
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Tabl 
Meeting with Mike Montague 
July 13, 1998 
Present* Ron Gamson, Dean Walker, and Mike Montague 
Purpose To discuss Mike Montague's performance in the Bountiful Employment office 
since being transferred from the Granger office and being placed on probation 
Discussion Ron Garrison discussed with Mike the concerns that Sandy Thomas has with his 
performance since he has been transferred to Bountiful Ron indicated that things 
are not going well and that the LDS Employment Headquarters Staff are 
concerned with his performance 
Ron said that he understood that it was difficult to supervise Jim Fox, but Mike's 
performance was below standard in Granger- even to the point where termination 
was discussed It was indicated that a decision was made to put him in Bountiful 
to give mm an opportunity to continue his employment. 
Because of concerns noted by Sandy Thomas, Ron indicated, that Mike would net 
be able to return to the Bountiful Emolovment office The following are concerns 
that Sandy Thomas outimed 
1. Mike tried to intervene on a concern Sandy had regarding a 
contractor to repair lighting in the unit. He questioned the way 
Sandv handled the situation This was none of his business 
2. Mike used vulgarity to a parking attendant during a luncheon at the 
Olive Garden this past week. This is totally inappropriate 
3. Mike did net agree to the way that Sandy wanted him to work with 
an executive He had difficulty in confronting this individual and 
redirecting him 
4 Since Sue Looney has been cut in the Granger office it is apparent 
that the unit is in bad shape It was pointed out to Mike that he had 
not managed the office well. 
5. Mike interrupted a phone call that Sandy was having to inform her 
that his chair was tipping and that he wanted his old chair back 
He had claimed that this was an emergency He did not apologize . 
6 The secretary in Bountiful was applying for employment and 
needed Mike to look at a letter she had written. He responded and 
said that it was not grammatically correct. Sandy proofed it and it 
was fine. Mike responded in regard to the secretary leaving-
"Good, she is stubborn." This inappropriate, since she needed 
encouragement not undue criticism. 
7. Mike made comments to Sandy, "We both need to loose weight." 
This was offensive to Sandy Thomas. 
8. On Friday evening Sandy told Mike to have a nice weekend. He 
responded by saying, "Okay, don't let the door hit you in the 
(made a rude notice) on the way out. Sandy said "Mike!" He said 
"well, I didn't say it did I?" The secretary witnessed this 
inappropriate remark. 
Conclusion: Ron reminded Mike that he had been given a warning letter earlier in the year and 
now was on probation due to a lack of performance in the Granger office. Ron 
told Mike that the concerns now in Bountiful make if difficult for him to continue 
his employment and he would not be able to return to the Bountiful office. 
The following options were given to Mike Montague: 
1. Resign from his employment and seek new employment. 
2. Be terminated due to inappropriate conduct and lack of 
performance. 
3. Follow the grievance policy of the Church. 
4. Meet with Gar/ Winters on Friday July 17, 1998 to discuss his 
concerns. 
Ron gave Mike the next two weeks to decide what he is going to do. Mike wiil 
use his annual leave instead of having his employment suspended. He will call 
Dean Walker to inform him of his decision. 
Following the discussion Dean Walker went out to the Bountiful office while 
Mike cleaned out his desk. The keys to the facility have been turned in and 
returned to Sandy Thomas. 
Tab 2 
David A. McPhie (2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 East Murray-Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801)278-3700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL CHARLES MONTAGUE, 
Plaintiff. 
-vs-
MOANA FAIRBANKS MONTAGUE. 
nka MO ANA FAIRBANKS. 
Defendant. 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Civil No. 964900839 DA 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
Plaintiff: 
Address: 
SSN: 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Birthdate: 
Michael Charles Montague 
2760 South Centerbrook Drive 
West Valley City. Utah 84119 
529-62-4122 
Shipping Supervisor 
Industrial Container & Supply 
10/15/47 
NOTE: This declaration must be filed with the domestic calendar clerk 5 days prior to the pre-
trial hearing. Failure by either party to complete, present, and file this form as required will 
authorize the court to accept the statement of the other party as the basis for its decision. 
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE 
PENALTY FOR PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
1. GROSS MONTHLY INCOME: 
Salary/Wages $2,083.33 
Pension/Retirement 
Social Security 
Disability Insurance 
Unemployment Insurance 
Public Assistance 
Child Support from prior marriage 
Dividends/Interest 
Rents 
Other 
$ 
s 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
s 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME: 52,083.33 4- [^0^ 
2. ITEMIZE MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
FROM GROSS INCOME: 
State and Federal Income Taxes $279.83 
Number of Exemptions Taken 
Social Security 
Medical or Other Insurance 
Union or Other Dues 
Retirement or Pension Fund 
Disability 
Savings Plan 
Credit Union 
Other (specify) 
M(l) 
$153.34 
$79.02 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS: S512.19 
/ ^ I -
3. NET MONTHLY INCOME 51,571.14 
j " 
4. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: 
Creditor's Name For Balance Monthly Payment 
TOTAL: $ $ 
5. ALL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES KNOWN TO ME OWNED 
INDIVIDUALLY OR JOINTLY: (Indicate who holds or how title is held.) 
Value Owed Thereon 
a. Household furnishings, Furniture, 
appliances and equipment: $ $ 
b. Automobiles (Year, Make): 
$ $ 
c. Securities, Stocks, Bonds: 
$ $ 
d. Cash and Deposit Accounts: 
Checking $ 
Savings S 
e. Life Insurance 
Name of Company Policy No. Face Amount Cash Value 
S S 
f. Profit Sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name Value of Interest and amount presently vested 
g. Other Personal Property and Assets (specify) 
h. Real Estate: 
Address: 
Type of Property: 
Date of Acquisition: 
Original Cost: $ 
Cost of Additions: $ 
Total Cost: $ 
Total Present Value: $ 
Basis of Valuation: 
Mortgage Balance: $ 
Other Liens: $ 
Equity: $ 
Monthly Amortization: 
And to Whom: 
Taxes: $ 
Individual Contributions: 
i. Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business, value less indebtedness): 
j . Other Assets (specify): 
6. TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES: *(Specify which partv is the custodial parent and 
list name and relationship of all members of the household whose expenses are 
included,) 
* Self, Jeri (wife) Hyrum (son) 
Rent or Mortgage Payments SSS^ .OO 
Real Property Taxes S 
Real Property Insurance S 
Maintenance S25.Q0 
Food and Household Supplies {' S250.0fy f/zy fa „ <-/£ 
Utilities (Water, electricity, gas and heat) ^SSfrffi^ 
Telephone (SJOQQj 
Laundry and Cleaning $5.00 
Clothing I 
Medical flOO.OO)— PA uMJ^ 
Dental 1 
Insurance (life, accident, disability, etc) SI00.00 (Auto) 
(Exclude payroll deducted) 
Child Care ^J£—Z^x 
Payment of Child/Spousal Support ( S60(X00N ) 
(RE: Prior Marriage) ~ -^ 
School 
Entertainment (Clubs, social obligations, 
travel, recreation, etc.) S25.00 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, <rr*j>U n <-lr*i*k. 
gifts and donations) ^250.00j 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto Expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance) S75.00 
Auto Payments 
Installment Payment(s) 
Other Expenses S 
Condo Association Fee ^r^P"\ SIO&QQ--^ . 7 , ,*,,/, 
Attorney's Fees 7 ' $ ^ S550.00' < ^ K < * w r r * ^ . *<""' " 
Storage Fees $69.00 p 
TOTAL EXPENSES 52,928-00 tO l 
-Lrb o 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct. 
DATED this °r^ day of J l d ^ U - , 1999. 
/wJLJL(!7/Uf^Sl 
Michael C. Montague 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / ' day of \ I I / 1 1 M ^ 1999. 
r\ n xA M / v . NOTARYJKlBLIC, in and for 0 
W M If. \L\°\M Salt Lake County, Utah 
(J J 
Mv Commission Expires: 
'a 
u 
SAWf I HUTCHINGS | 
2106 & Murray Noladay M i 
Sat L*» dry, Utah 8iU7 
My Cofnmiwion Expire. * 
JuV 10, 1990 J 
D:\WP6l\CLIENTS\MONTAGUE\3-FD PET 
Tab 3 
f iiw\vi*l bdUrxtim (tynffMisofi 
MICHAEL MONTAGUE 
Income 
SEPT. 1996 JUL. 1999 
Income $3726.00 $2083.33 
Net income $2422.13 $1571.14 
Expenses 
Rent/Mortgage $250.00 $584.00 
Maintenance $25.00 
Food & household supplies $250.00 $250.00 
Utilities $80.00 
Telephone $90.00 
Laundry & cleaning $5.00 
Clothing $100.00 $25.00 
Medical $100.00 $100.00 
Auto insurance $100.00 
Child/Spousal support $735.00 $600.00 
Entertainment $150.00 $25.00 
Incidentals $425.00 (incl. tithing) $250.00 
Auto expenses $150.00 $75.00 
Auto payments $335.00 
Installment payments $100.00 
Condo association fees $100.00 
Attorney's fees $550.00 
Storage fees $69.00 
TOTAL(EXPENSES) $2595.00 $2928.00 
D:\WP6 l\CLIENTS\MONTAGUE\SCOMPAiUSON 
Tab 4 
w 
Monday, July 27, 1998 
To Whom It May Concern, 
On this day, Monday, August 3, 1998,1 do hereby resign my employment with 
the Employment Resource Services Department of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints. 
Tab 5 
T H £ C H U R C H O F 
JESUS CHRIST 
0FLATTER-DAY 
SAINTS 
Exit Inte. .<ew Questionnaire Personnel Department Confidential 
Date I Name 
Thank wm i fnr f i l l inn m jf fhp fn l lnwinn si irvpv Ym ir ranHiH fpoHha^u- ie i m m r t ' i n f ^ Wo hank you for filling out the follo ing survey our candid feedback is i portant to us 
Your responses will be reviewed by a member of management who is at least one level aoove your 
super/isor Please complete the following items and circle the appropriate number on the scale 
Acd written comments below (use the back of this sheet if necessary) 
Please return the completed form to your personnel director/coordinator 
rms information will ce "eviewed by the .nterviewer before your exit interview, which will be conducted as follows 
Name ct mrerviewer 
1 My reason 'or 'eavmg (use ;he bacK or this sheet if necessary; 
*2>ec/6t.c/ Vc foc^ -A'1. /V2^' ^ / ^ ^ y ^ w 
Questionnaire 
< 
2 My supervisor and 1 regularly reviewed my progress toward estaolisned goals and 
reset them wnen appropriate 
3 I saw a strong link between my performance and my pay. 
4 i was well trained by the Church to do my job 
5 l felt that my JOO contnbutec to (he missions of the Church 
6 Vly achievements were recognized 
" My ceoartment management Kept me advised of my career patn opocrtunities 
3 I was fairly compensated for my experience skills and 'evel or responsibility 
9 I was satisfied with the Churcn Senem plans 
G There was a sense of teamwork in my work group 
i My superyisor understood the work I did 
2 My superyisor was fair and consistent m his/her behavior with subordinates 
3 I feit that I was treated like a valued employee 
Comments <w,se rHe Oack a Tiis sneer r necessary) 
Tab 6 
5*U« |«« jOU>U1KM 
0 F
 L A T T E R - D A Y EmP fOY*e Treatment 
SAINTS Date ot orgm 
March 1, 1955 
Caie ol revision 
I January 20, 7998 
(f*rc— 
PHILOSOPHY 
The Church seeks to create a work environment that encourages effective 
communication and working relationships between employees and management. 
POLICY 
There is an orderly, approved procedure that allows employees to discuss 
work-related concerns through proper management channels. 
PROCEDURE 
Step. 
Step 2 
Steo 3 
The employee should try to resolve work-related concerns with the 
immediate supervisor. The deoartment's Human Resource 
representative is available to assist if the supervisor or employee so 
desires. Employees who fee! that their immediate supervisor is part 
of the concern may go directly to the second level supervisor. 
If the concern is not resolved ?n step 1, the employes may request a 
review of the concern with the highest non-General Authority level of 
management in the department, (in tne case of field employees, Area 
Presidencies or temple presidents will normally become directly 
invoivec in the review process as a Dart of step 4.) The review 
discussion can be held with or without the presence of other 
department supervisors. The department's Human Resource 
representative or a senior administrator of the Human Resource 
Department may be invited to be present during the discussions with 
the employee. 
If the concern ?s not resolved in step 2, the employee may raqusst a 
review of the concern with the managing director of the Human 
Resource Department. This review c^n be held wrth or without the 
presence of a supervisor from the employee's department. The 
department's Human Resource representative may be present during 
appropriate discussions. 
2»rt 2/5? •—raCr-jSA 
Vwl l U f W w f !Uf-
JESUS CHRIST ^ 
°
C L A T T T R " D A V / ^^pioyee Treatment 
S A I N T S 
00>'C, 
Qatft or o*"gin 
March 1, 1985 
Owe of revision 
January 20, 1993 
Steo 4 [f the concern is not resolved in step 3, the employee may request a 
review of the concern bv the Generaf Authority(ies) responsible for the 
employee's department. Before any meetings are set, the managing 
director of the Human Resource Department w»lf explain the situation 
in detail to the General Authority, W^ere an Area Presidency or a 
temole president, and a headquarters Genera! Authority ar* both 
involved in the management of a function, both should be involved in 
the review process. The final response will be made by the 
headquarters General Authority responsible for the employee's 
department. He may or may not meet vvith the concerned employee. 
After each step of the appeal process the appropriate level of management should 
gtve the employee a written response advising the employee of the decision. 
The department Human Resource representative may be askea ro provide counsel or 
he!p in resolving the concern at any time during tne review process. 
220<a 3i3Z ^ e d ^ oS* 
Tab 7 
Date: 
. 7 -a T.75*-
'Person Initiating Action: 
Name: 
Telephone Numberf-^ * f-y'&S*-
Employee Io/bmudoo: 
EMPLOYEE NAME: 
Position Number (FTE): 
Last Work Day: ^ " - 3 - ^ ( T 
COSZ/2 
£**/ <=> Unif__ 6r^ 
gc^ 
^ s &-?/•}«*£&&&& 
Termination code:* OTE-
Voluntary 
Reason for Termination: 
S Involuntary 
KVs'>»«-/'o-^ ^>L'H>^', '* t-aQ/frsa-*! • 
Rehire: 
Yes No Review_ 
Exit Interview Conducted: 
Yes ;XNO 
Exit Interview Questionnaire Completed: 
Yes , / No 
^^<C 
<^ SeniQr Humap)Resource Representative 
- i 
1 ! 
^MSN 
OTET 
PAR 
PAY 
POL 
REF 
RTF 
RTR 
SLA 
SUP 
TAF 
TMP 
ENS 
WOR 
Mission Service 
Resigning for Other EmpOorer 
Parenting: 
Dissatisfied with Pay 
Dissatisfied wtifc Policies 
Refused Transfer 
Redaction in Force 
Retirement 
Spouse Leaving Ares 
Dissatisfied vrith Supervisor 
Transfer to Affiliate 
End Temporary Employment 
Uasatisfixctoiy Work 
Dissatisfied with Working 
'1 
J 
% 
3 
r 1 
"\ 
* 
j 
i 
i 
4 
1 
3 
% 
3 
3 
1 
4 
1 
1 
i 
i 
t 
i 
3 
Tab 8 
JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
WELFAPE SERVICES 
Seventh Floor 
50 East North Temple Street 26 June 1998 
Salt Lake Cty, Utah 34150 
Michael Montague 
LDS Employment Sen/ices 
3648 South 7200 West 
Magna, UT 84044 
Dear Mike: 
This letter is to notify you that you are being demoted from Supervisor- Employment Office 
to the position of Employment Specialist and you are being placed on probation, because of 
unsatisfactory work performance. 
Specific areas of concern include: 
1. Failure to appropriately supervise staff Supervision requires that the manager 
motivate staff and work with them to meet productivity standards and minimum job requirements. 
Such supervision requires that goals, expectations and work assignments are communicated 
adequately. These were not adequately communicated. 
2. Failure to follow instructions from voursupervisor In a meeting held with Jim Holm 
and myself on May 20, you were instructed to hold regular weekly meetings with your staff to 
review goals, expectations, and work assignments for the coming week. You failed to hold these 
meetings as instructed. 
3. Failure to address the challenees that existed between vou and vour emciovment 
specialist. In this same meeting you were instructed to work closely with the employment specialist 
to help resolve issues that caused him anxiety and physical illness. You avoided addressing the 
issues, causing the employment specialist further anxiety. 
In order to remain in your new position, it is expected that you will: 
1. Meet service plan kev indicator performance expectations Your new supervisor, 
Saudi Thomas, will establish with you specific performance expectations regarding the number of 
job ready, job preparation and job creation placements you should accomplish, to help the center 
achieve its service plan. 
2. Follow instructions eiven to vou b v vour new supervisor. Your supervisor will give 
you instructions to perform duties apart from the key indicators, in areas such as ecclesiastical 
training, interagency coordination, and volunteer supervision. You will be expected to follow these 
instructions. 
3. Meet regularly with vour supervisor to review performance. Your supervisor will 
establish a schedule of regular meetings in which she will review your performance against key 
indicators and this probationary plan. 
Effective today, you are on probation for up to ninety (90) calendar days. Failure to comply 
with the terms of this probation, both during and after the probationary period, will result in 
termination of your employment. Your performance rating has been reduced to 4.0. 
If you have questions regarding this letter, or what changes are expected of you, please visit 
with meor your supervisor, Sandi Thomas, to receive clarification. Sister Thomas and I are desirous 
to see corrections made that will enable you to become the employee you desire to be and to prevent 
further disciplinary action from occurring. 
I have read and understood this letter of probation. 
Tab 9 
27. 
NOTES OF CONVERSATION WITH MIKE MONTAGUE 
June 26,1998 
Jun Holm, Dean Walker and I (Bennie Lilly) met with Mike Montague in my office. After 
greetings and a brief prayer, I reviewed with Mike the letter (attached) which was prepared 
announcing his demotion from Supervisor-Employment Office to Employment Specialist. It also 
contains the provisions of his probation. 
Wliile he was obviously not pleased, he did not deny any of the allegations. He did apologize for 
putting us in the position where we had to take these steps He felt disappomted that we had to " 
come up with" these areas of concerns in order to bring about the demotion. 
I indicated that he would be asked to tram the new employment specialist, Sue Looney, on 
Monday, June 29, and Tuesday, June 30. Then he would be asked to report to the Bountiful 
Center on Wednesday, July 1, with Sandi Thomas as his new manager She would meet with 
him and prepare a performance plan with specific goals, and then report to me on his progress 
We all indicated our desire for him to succeed in his new assignment. We consider him a 
valuable employee, lacking managerial skills, but with well developed skills in helpmg job 
seekers one on one If he lacked such skills, we might not be offenng this opportumty for him to 
continue employment. He indicated that he felt he could make Sandi "look good" with his 
performance. 
I also indicated to him that in his new position, he would be working with a member of the 
opposite sex, a different association for him than that of the past several years It would be 
important for him to conduct himself in a professional manner, remembering the special 
sensitivities and courtesies that need to be shown to any member of the opposite sex. For 
example, he would not be able to nde in a car alone with Sandi. I indicated that I had been in a 
similar situation working with a female (Julie Poole) as the only two employees in a center 
myseif in the past. He would need to adjust to this new arrangement. 
Mike was then asked to sign the letter as an mdication that he had read and understood it. Jim 
and I also signed the letter as witnesses. Jim and Dean were given the opportumty to share any 
additional comments, which were limited to expressions of hope for success Mike was given 
the chance to ask any additional questions, which he did not, and the meeting ended with him 
departing, shaking hands with each of us. 
